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This study was commissioned by Transport Canada (TC) in support of a cooperative regulatory activity between itself, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regarding Type III exit access and ease of operation.
EASA has formulated a Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) and Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) under the auspices of a Rulemaking Group (CS 25.040) comprising representatives from TC and the FAA and from aircraft operators, aircraft manufacturers, and cabin crew organizations.
The subject NPA proposes that CS-25 be amended to require that airplanes should be configured with Automatically Disposable Hatches (ADHs) at Type III exits and with applicability should be to airplanes with a passenger seating capacity of 40 or more. The objective of this report was to address any issues that might affect the selection of 40 passenger seats as the lower limit for installation of ADHs at Type III exits. Therefore, this study considers the safety impact of the proposed regulation should it be applied to airplanes with a passenger seating capacity between 20 and 80.
A benefit analysis carried out for ADHs at Type III exits suggests that the life-saving potential for airplanes with a passenger seating capacity of less than 40 is small compared to larger airplanes. A review of the CAR 525/CS-25/14 CFR 25 exit requirements pertinent to airplanes certificated with a passenger seating capacity between 20 and 80 suggests that evacuation capability increases as passenger complement decreases, and that enhancements to evacuation capability are not warranted for airplanes with a passenger seating capacity of less than 40.
Tests were performed at the Federal Aviation Administration William J. Hughes Technical Center by the Fire Safety Team of the Airport and Aircraft Research and Development Group to determine if intermixing different manufacturer cells within an aircraft nickel-cadmium battery has an effect on battery performance and if any such effect results in a safety of flight issue.
A series of tests from RTCA/DO-293 were conducted on two batteries, one consisted of all original equipment manufacturer (OEM) cells, and one consisted of ten OEM and ten Part Manufacturer Approval (PMA) replacement cells. The tests included several rated capacity tests, a charge stability test, a duty performance test, and an induced destructive overcharge test. Throughout the tests, only slight differences between the OEM and intermixed batteries were observed. The PMA cells consistently charged at a higher voltage; however, none of the cells exceeded the maximum voltage of 1.7 V. During some tests, individual cells showed some differences in behavior and recorded battery temperatures. The most notable difference occurred during the induced destructive overcharge tests, in which a larger number of cells from the intermixed battery recorded increased voltage readings, indicating signs of thermal runaway. The results show no indication of any safety of flight issues arising from the intermixing of OEM and PMA battery cells within a nickel-cadmium aircraft battery.
Following the Boeing 747 freighter airplane accident on September 3, 2010, at Dubai International Airport in the United Arab Emirates, the Federal Aviation Administration, Transport Canada, and the United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority initiated a study to assess the magnitude of the potential threat to freighter airplanes from onboard cargo fires. As part of this study, a risk model was developed to assess the likely number of U.S.-registered freighter fire accidents through the year 2020 and the average annual cost due to their occurrence. The study focused on the potential fire threat from the bulk shipment of lithium batteries (primary and secondary) because they were likely contributors to two of the freighter fire accidents that occurred on U.S.-registered airplanes. For this reason, the risk model considered the potential threat from lithium batteries separately from other cargo.
This report summarizes the risk model, explains the data and algorithms used, and explains how the model may be used. Subsequent phases of this study will address cost benefit ratios for various mitigation strategies.
Click here to download the model (MS Excel 2007 or later, 101 MB)
The Airport and Aircraft Safety Research and Development Group Fire Safety Team performed tests at the Federal Aviation Administration William J. Hughes Technical Center using the environmental chamber and the Air Induction Facility (wind tunnel) to examine the variation in flammability exposure of a fuel tank composed of a composite material skin and a traditional aluminum skin. Tests were also conducted to examine the impact of material topcoat color on fuel tank temperature and hydrocarbon concentrations.
The correlation between high total hydrocarbon concentration measurements and high ullage temperature increases in all tests provided further indication that ullage temperature changes were the driving force behind in-flight flammability for fuel tanks when heated from above. This is contrary to what had been found for a heated center wing fuel tank in which the average bulk fuel temperature is the main driver behind fuel tank flammability.
The tests showed that composite panels, regardless of topcoat color, have the potential to result in a significant increase in flammability exposure because they transmit radiant heat into the fuel tank much more readily than a traditional aluminum fuel tank. However, the results also showed that under the right conditions, either through additional heat input or a change in material topcoat color, an aluminum fuel tank could behave similar to a composite fuel tank.
Federal Aviation Administration