



Evacuation Slide And Slide/Raft Reliability

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Topics To Be Covered

- Design issues
- Deployment intervals
- Maintenance practices
- FAA regulations
- Accident and incident investigations







- Although accidents are rare statistically, they will continue to occur
- When they do occur, evacuation systems must work flawlessly
 - Consequences of failure can be lethal to passengers and crew





Romulus, Michigan (Dec. 1990)

- Northwest Airlines DC-9 and 727 involved in ground collision
- 727 wing destroyed the two right side exits
- Tailcone exit malfunctioned and did not open
 - Bodies of one flight attendant and one passenger found in tailcone




















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San Juan, PR (June 1998)

- American Airlines A300 experienced engine fire shortly after takeoff
- Evacuated passengers on runway
- Four left side exit not usable
- Doors 1R and 3R did not operate as intended
 - Other problems discovered during investigation


























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














American Airlines Airbus A300B4-605R, N80057 San Juan, PR July 09, 1998 1407 UTC



Honolulu, HI (August 1997)

- Delta Air Lines L-1011 performed rejected takeoff
- Wheel/brake fire ensued in left main gear
- Passengers evacuated through 6 of 8 exits
- Two doors experienced failure of evacuation systems











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Detroit, Michigan (March 2001)

- Northwest Airlines A320 performed rejected takeoff and ran off runway
- All exits opened for evacuation
- Evacuation slide/raft at door 2L separated from airplane when door was opened
 - Pack fell to ground with girt bar and did not inflate



















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




































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09-11-01

- All U.S. carriers have FAA-approved maintenance programs for each type of plane the operate
- PMIs receive guidance from Inspector Handbook 8300.10 and MRB report
- Maintenance programs may differ between airlines at discretion of each PMI

Adequacy Of Existing Emergency Evacuation System Maintenance Programs



- Required on-airplane deployments is generally very small
- Usually not more than one shipset per year
- At least one carrier has been permitted to perform no on-airplane deployments
- Inadvertent deployments are allowed to count towards maintenance deployment requirement



Adequacy Of Existing Emergency Evacuation System Maintenance Programs



- Safety Board recommendation A-99-99 asked FAA to discontinue practice of allowing inadvertent deployments to count towards maintenance requirement
- Reasons
 - Conditions not controlled
 - Important information not collected







- FAA agreed with the intent of the recommendation
- But also responded that inadvertent deployments are "not used as maintenance program compliance demonstrations"
- Safety Board disagreed with that statement





ENGINEERING SPECIFICATION MAINTENANCE

ESM	A300	
PAGE 26-9	REV BF	
DATE	12/17/1998	

System - 25 - Equipment/Furnishings

TEM NUMBER (EngSec)	ITEM	SPEC. REQ.	TASK DESCRIPTION	ZONE	MSG MTC PRCS	INTERVAL (THRESHOLD)	CONTROL DOCUMENT
16.00 (36)	ESCAPE SLIDES / RAFTS	•	OPERATIONAL CHECK - ESCAPE SLIDES / RAFTS SYSTEM - BY SAMPLING) © TEST OF ONE SLIDE OR SLIDE RAFT PER DOOR POSITION PER YEAR 1) -SYMETRICAL DOORS ARE CONSIDERED AS ONE DOOR POSITION. 2) -SWAPPING SIDES YEARLY IS RECOMMENDED 3) -RECORDED INADVERTENT OR CREW TRAINING DEPLOYMENTS MAY BE USED IN SATISFYING THIS REQUIREMENT	200		1 Уезга	2904 2905
17.00 (36)	INDIVIDUAL LIFE VESTS	6	CHECK - OVERHAUL DUE DATE @ HEPLACEMENT REQUIRED 6 YRS AFTER MANUFACTURE DATE OR 3 YRS AFTER DATE OF RESTORATION.	200	8	2B	0913 2431 2437 2438 2439 E8O 11390





09-11-01

- NTSB recommendation A-99-100 asked the FAA to require operators to perform a one-time sampling of evacuation system deployments
- In response, the FAA formed a joint FAA/industry response team to examine 10 years of SDR data on evacuation systems





- NTSB disagreed with using SDRs for this purpose
 - Concerned that reporting requirements may not be adequate to identify recurring failure modes
- Safety Board staff reviewed SDR system as part of its investigation of A300 incident
 - Found missing, misleading, and inaccurate entries





740DA LKHEED			SLIDE	MALFUNCTIONED	
TAKEOFF	0	OTHER	ABORTED TAKEOFF		
DALA 1011385115				R4 DOOR	
08/07/1997	0				
2565 193C1244			SO	DLL14971585	
199708210037		CT-MWG-T-			
TOUR BIOURI	SOOD DID N	OT OBEN AND THE OF T	SE DED MOT DEDI	ON DEIDING BULLOUIATION	

A FOUR RIGHT DOOR DID NOT OPEN AND THE SLIDE DID NOT DEPLOY DURING EVACUATION. FOUND 'T' HANDLE NOT FULLY DEPLOYED, OPS CHECK NORMAL.





Conclusion

- Current maintenance practices and operational checks do not adequately ensure that emergency evacuation systems will operate as intended in the event of an actual emergency evacuation
- More aggressive measures are needed to identify and correct potential malfunctions *before* they occur in an actual evacuation

