SWISSAIR FLIGHT 111 Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB)



The Third Triennial International Aircraft Fire & Cabin Safety

Research Conference

22-25 Oct 2001

Presented by

Vic Gerden, IIC & John R. Britten SR 111 Safety Action Coordinator



<u>Methodology</u>

SR111 Sequence of Events / Timeline

Event - Wreckage Analysis

Deficiency Validation

Safety Communication



The Event

Swissair Flight 111 Wednesday, September 2, 1998 22:31 Atlantic Daylight Time New York to Geneva 215 passengers and 14 crew 18 different nationalities just off Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia





Timeline

 00:00 - smell something unusual 02:37 - smoke assessed as visible • 03:37 - Pan Pan Pan 04:58 - decision to go to Halifax 10:10 - decision to dump fuel 13:11 - cabin bus P/B on 13:32 - A/P 2 kicks off 14:04 - declare emergency 15:03 - loss of recorders / communications 20:40 - water impact

Recovery (Challenges and Opportunities)





Reconstruction



Fire-Related Deficiencies

Thermal Acoustic Insulation Material

In-Flight Firefighting

Material Flammability Standards



Inermal Acoustical Insulation

Material

Recovered Insulation Material





Inermal Acoustical Insulation

Material

Regulatory Requirements

- FAR 25.853 Appendix F
- Vertical Bunsen Burner Test
- History
 - various aircraft fires in which MPET provided fuel
 - other cover materials



World Airways (NTSB DCA99SA051 refers)







Inermal Acoustical Insulation

Material

- Materials Testing Research
 - FAA partnership critical to





Inermal Acoustical Insulation

Material



- MPET exhibits inappropriate flammability characteristics
- Test Criteria requires review



Thermal Acoustical Insulation <u>Material</u> <u>TSB Recommendations</u>

...action be taken reduce or eliminate the risk associated with the use of MPET covered insulation blankets in aircraft, and

...that all thermal acoustic insulation materials be validated against more rigorous test criteria that are representative of actual in-service system performance



Ongoing investigation revealed deficiencies in:

- design;
- equipment;
- crew training;
- awareness; and
- procedures.
- Time is the critical resource



Smoke/Fire Detection and Suppression

- requirement for built-in systems is based on presence of:
 - fuel; and
 - ignition source
- most of the rest of the aircraft relies on human intervention
- presence of known ignition sources and flammable materials
- therefore, the Board recommended that:
 -more needs to be done to improve detection and suppression capabilities in the pressurized areas of the aircraft



Risk of Remaining Airborne - Emergency Landing

- experience based "non-event" perception
- company culture, commercial considerations, safety concerns, etc
- preparing for a diversion often the last item on the list...

therefore, the Board recommended that:

industry standards reflect a philosophy that when odour/smoke from an unknown source is present, the most appropriate course of action is to prepare to land the aircraft expeditiously



Firefighting Efficiency in the Pressurized Portion of the Aircraft

- handheld extinguishers
- inherent limitations
- accessibility
- crew coordination
 - roles, responsibilities, and training
- therefore, the Board recommended that:
 -a review of current in-flight firefighting standards including procedures, training, equipment, and accessibility....to ensure aircraft crews are prepared to respond immediately, effectively and in a coordinated manner any in-flight fire



- Time Required to Troubleshoot in Odour/Smoke Situations
 - in presence of odour/smoke environment checklists are crucial...they may involve
 - electrical power removal and/or isolating systems
 - no regulatory requirement
 - checklist completion time is variable...up to 30 minutes!!
 - goal should be...
 - to eliminate source before or soon after ignition
- therefore, the Board recommended that:
 -action be taken to ensure that odour/smoke checklist items be designed to be completed in a timeframe that will minimize the possibility of an in-flight fire being ignited or sustained



Integrated Firefighting Measures

- identify systemic deficiencies
- aircraft and equipment design changes have been made in isolation
- "systems" approach prevent, detect, control, and eliminate aircraft fires
- all aspects should be integrated and complementary
- therefore, the Board recommended that:
 - authorities review the adequacy of in-flight firefighting as a whole, to ensure that aircraft crews are provided with a system whose elements are complementary and optimized to provide the maximum probability of detecting and suppressing any in-flight fire.



Material Flammability Standards

- based on low probability of in-flight fire....focus on post crash fire
- current FAR requirements result in:
 - flammable materials with acceptable burn rate
 - materials that self-extinguish within acceptable burn time and length
 - selected cabin materials that self-extinguish and release minimum heat and smoke



Hook & Loop Fastener System





Material Flammability Standards

- toxicity & smoke generation issues need to be considered, however....
- the Board believes that the most effective means to mitigate the risk is to eliminate materials that sustain or propagate fire
- therefore, the Board recommended that:
 - material used in the manufacture of an aeronautical product should not propagate or sustain a fire in any realistic operating environment



Material Flammability Test Requirements for Aircraft Wiring





- Material Flammability Test Requirements for Aircraft Wiring
 - 20 wires exhibited evidence of arcing
 - wires as an ignition source in SR 111...have not been







Material Flammability Test Requirements for Aircraft Wiring

- wiring is a critical system in modern
- wires play a role in smoke/fire events
- wires as an ignition source in SR 111...have not been ruled out
- active vs passive....yet
- material flammability tests for wires are the same as passive materials
- wire protection limitations, e.g. circuit breakers
- currently the dynamics of wire failures are unknown



therefore, the Board recommended that:

 a certification test regime be mandated that evaluates aircraft electrical wire failure characteristics under realistic operating conditions and against specified performance criteria, with a goal of mitigating the risk of ignition



• System Evaluation: Fire Hardening Considerations

- various materials have exhibited less than ideal fire propagation characteristics
- in most cases there is no requirement to determine how a material's failure might exacerbate an in-flight fire
- FAR 25.1309 requires that the consequences of a system's failure be analysed, however

– not specifically in the face of an in-flight fire

- assessing a system's failure and designing system to delay failures
- candidate systems include;

-oxygen, hydraulic, wiring, and air environmental



Silicon Duct End Cap



- therefore, the Board recommended that:
 -as a prerequisite to certification all systems, whose failure could exacerbate a fire in progress, be evaluated to ensure they are designed to mitigate the risk of fireinduced failure



Safety Action Initiatives

- Regulatory Authorities
 - committed to harmonization of regulations
- Swissair
 - Land as soon as possible
 - modified checklists, procedures and training
 - maintenance best practices awareness
 - MD-11 Modification Plus Program, which involves
 - installation of detection and suppression system in attic area
 - includes video surveillance



Safety Action Initiatives

FAA

- MPET ADs
- Thermal Acoustic Insulation Materials test NPRM
- Review of existing programs
 - Fire Tests for Materials in Inacessible Areas
 - Review of Fire Tests for Wires
 - Detection & Extinguishing in Inacessible Areas
 - Establish industry standards for
 - emergency landing
 - checklist procedures for smoke of unknown origin
 - comprehensive in-flight firefighting procedures

Enhanced Airworthiness Program for Airplane Systems

 umbrella program to coordinate all wire related initiatives

Remaining Issues

Thermal Acoustic Insulation Materials Residual Risk

Limitations of Radiant Panel Test

Toxicity, smoke, heat release standards



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